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Chapter One: Introduction and Exposition 
 
1.1 - Introduction 
 
John Rawls‘ Political Liberalism opens with a question: ―how is it possible for there to 
exist over time a just and stable society of free and equal citizens, who remain 
profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?‖1 
Rawls regards this question as the heart of modern political philosophy within the 
democratic tradition, and his own work can be understood as an attempt to answer it 
successfully. It is also the heart of this joint honours thesis, and I shall refer to it as the 
fundamental question.
2
 My aim is to evaluate the answer that Rawls provides to this 
question in his Political Liberalism. To do so, I turn, rather unusually, to the medieval 
Icelandic Free State (‗the Commonwealth‘ as I shall call it hereafter) as an example to 
enrich my critical response to Rawlsian thought. Of course, the use of such an unusual 
example requires a good deal of explanation, which is compounded by the fact that I 
attempt to offer a new understanding of the Commonwealth along the way. As such, 
this thesis is located at the intersection of two distinct disciplines: Old Norse studies and 
contemporary political philosophy. 
 In the Old Norse portion with which the thesis commences, I attempt to show 
that in the Commonwealth there existed what I label a public and political notion of 
justice. This idea, which I sketch in greater detail shortly, is inspired by Rawls‘ 
writings, in which he appeals to ideas ―implicit in the public culture of democratic 
                                                 
1 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, exp. ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 4. All 
subsequent citations refer to this edition. 
2 Rawls calls this question the ―combined question‖ and something else the ―fundamental question‖, but I 
stick to my own terminology; ibid., 20, 44. 
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society.‖3 The notion of justice can be understood as an implicit part of the public 
culture of the Commonwealth. Focusing primarily upon the Commonwealth‘s 
conversion to Christianity in 1000AD, I discuss the ways in which I perceive traditional 
accounts to be deficient, before introducing the notion of justice more fully. I suggest 
that the notion of justice consisted of five understandings, widely shared by the 
Commonwealth‘s citizens (landsmenn), about their status as members of a society, the 
nature of that society, how social interactions should take place and so on. As I outline 
these shared understandings, I provide evidence to support my view that they were a 
prominent cultural feature of the Commonwealth. Lastly, I sketch the way in which the 
notion of justice can provide a deeper explanation of how the conversion occurred. My 
overall contention is that the conversion was able to occur not because of prudential, 
ritualistic or other reasons, but because the public acceptance of the shared 
understandings in the notion of justice proved more motivationally forceful than any 
contrary desires. 
I move in the second portion of the thesis towards solidifying the links between 
the two disciplines. From a philosophical perspective, the intended culmination of this 
portion of the thesis will be the conclusion that the characteristics of the Commonwealth 
render it, at the very least, not irrelevant to Rawls‘ thinking. It can plausibly be 
characterised, I argue, as a society divided by reasonable religious doctrines which 
possessed a shared fund of implicit cultural ideas which helped to regulate political life. 
It can therefore be understood as pertinent for the sake of philosophical discussion by 
virtue of its sufficient similarity to the sort of society about which Rawls theorises. No 
further explanation given now will make sense, but the aim of the second portion is to 
                                                 
3 Ibid., 15. 
3 
 
show that, insofar as there are differences between the Commonwealth and a modern 
democracy, they are not so grave or of such a type as to make the example inherently 
useless. 
 The final portion of the thesis will focus upon the earlier elements of the 
fundamental question: ―how is it possible for there to exist over time a just and stable 
society …?‖4 Just as my examination of the Commonwealth is influenced by Rawls‘ 
conceptual armoury, my discussion of Rawlsian philosophy is interwoven with strands 
of thought drawn from the Commonwealth. The example of the Commonwealth shows, 
I contend, that something like Rawls‘ solution is possible. I argue, however, that Rawls‘ 
solution fails to achieve justice because, to be justified, it requires what I call an 
external justification which cannot be obtained in a manner consistent with the theory as 
a whole. There, I use the Commonwealth to explain why the only potentially consistent 
external justification fails. Lastly, I turn to stability and claim that, without an external 
justification, Rawls‘ solution is not as stable as it should be. Again, I use the 
Commonwealth as an example to support my hypothesis. Given that the pertinence of 
the Commonwealth to Rawls is what justifies my approach, and given the lack of 
secondary literature which uses this rare approach, I rely heavily on discussion of 
Rawls‘ ideas directly and less than usual on what his critics have to say. 
 This thesis aims to constitute a worthwhile contribution to scholarship in both of 
its fields. The Old Norse portion should, I hope, shed new light upon the fascinating 
question of how such an unprecedented event as Iceland‘s conversion was possible, 
while the portion about Rawls should evaluate political liberalism in a way which will 
hopefully be of philosophical merit. I have chosen to discuss both of these areas 
                                                 
4 Ibid., 4. Italics added. 
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together, rather than writing each its own paper, because I believe that there is sufficient 
scope for overlap. Rawls‘ ideas have been instrumental for me in the development of 
my understanding of the Commonwealth, while the Commonwealth has offered me 
many interesting examples while discussing some vexed issues in political philosophy. 
 
1.2 - Iceland: Society and Sources 
 
The settlement period of Iceland is said to have begun around the year 870AD. Most 
immigrants came from the various Norse settlements and nations in the North Atlantic. 
Although the historical reasons for the settlement are complex, one major cause of 
emigration was oppressive use of power in other Norse lands.
5
 Norway, for example, 
prior to the settlement of Iceland, was ruled by many petty kings, until Haraldr Fine-
Hair began a war of conquest and united the country by violence. Many of those 
dispossessed by the war, unwilling to bend the knee to a new overlord or sceptical of the 
merits of centralised kingly power emigrated from Norway to Iceland to preserve their 
freedom. The same was true of many non-Norwegian settlers. Unnr or Auðr the Deep-
Minded, one prominent settler, travelled from Scotland to Iceland with a large following 
when she feared violence from her Scottish and Norse rivals.
6
 In the wilds of Iceland, 
these settlers took up land and distributed it amongst their followers, and soon 
established laws and district assemblies to settle potential disputes between them. They 
created a kingless society with no executive power, in which all free citizens 
(landsmenn) were equal before the law. The law was preserved by memory, with one 
third of them recited in public each year by a figure called the lawspeaker 
                                                 
5
 Gunnar Karlsson, Iceland’s 1100 Years: History of a Marginal Society (London: C. Hurst & Co., ltd., 
2000), 15. 
6 Ibid., 14. 
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(lǫgsǫgumaðr). Over the course of every three years, therefore, the lawspeaker would 
have recited the entire body of Icelandic law, but his role otherwise included little but 
settling disputes about what the law entailed. 
 Every year, beginning at the end of the settlement period, people travelled from 
all over the country to assemble at Þingvellir for the Alþingi, the national assembly.
7
 
Power was divided into a group of chieftaincies called goðorð. Fascinatingly, these 
chieftaincies – though hereditary – were actually property, and could be bought, sold, 
passed on or shared by multiple people at once. Even more interestingly, they were not 
associated with any given territory. Each chieftain (goði) had followers called 
assemblymen (þingmenn). Importantly, the goði-þingmenn relationship was a voluntary 
association. Each person could freely choose his own goði, and could switch to another 
one if disgruntled. Goðar were expected to support the interests of their þingmenn and 
provide them with legal support and so on – essentially using their political clout on 
their own and their followers‘ behalf. In turn, this political clout was constituted 
primarily by how many þingmenn could be persuaded to choose a given goði. With no 
standing forces, power and authority in the Commonwealth depended upon the consent 
of those without it, with laws upheld only by citizens‘ willingness to comply with them, 
backed up only with the threat of private sanctions. There are many more interesting 
features of the Commonwealth, and I can only afford to provide a brief sketch here. So 
far as possible, I have tried to avoid mentioning anything that does not come under this 
outline, but, inevitably, there are a few cases where I have needed to assume at least 
some degree of cultural familiarity. 
                                                 
7 Ibid., 20. 
6 
 
 When discussing the Commonwealth, the main sources on which I rely are 
Íslendingabók, Kristni saga and Brennu-Njáls saga (or Njála for short), in order of 
reliability.
8
 All of these sources were written more than a century at least after the 
events they record, and so must be used cautiously. Notably, though Íslendingabók is 
the result of the meticulous work of medieval Icelandic historian Ari Þorgilsson, two of 
these three sources are sagas. I will additionally appeal for evidence to several other 
sagas in the course of this thesis. There are legitimate concerns to be had about the 
historical veracity of the sagas, given, in particular, their status as literature. This 
concern does not render their use invalid, though. As William Ian Miller writes, ―to 
reject a source merely because it is good literature is a luxury of those historians who 
have what … are assumed to be better sources, if for no other reason than that they are 
duller.‖9 He goes on to say that, if ―early Icelandic social and cultural history is to be 
written‖, then ―literary sources will have to be used.‖10 Pithily, he calls this justification 
of his approach ―hardly a revolutionary claim outside saga studies, as the examples of 
biblical history, Frankish history, or the history of Homeric Greece amply illustrate.‖11 
Recognising the shortcomings of sources, it is still possible to use them, so long as one 
does so with an appropriate degree of caution. 
                                                 
8
 Dag Strömbäck places them in this same order, though admittedly with much greater pessimism about 
the usefulness of Njála. Dag Strömbäck, The Conversion of Iceland: A Survey, trans. Peter Foote 
(London: Viking Society for Northern Research, 1975), 20-3. The translations of these texts I use are 
Siân Grønlie, trans., Íslendingabók – Kristni saga – The Book of Icelanders – The Story of the 
Conversion (Exeter: Short Run Press, ltd., 2006), and Robert Cook, trans., Njal’s Saga (London: 
Penguin Books, 2001). Hereafter, I cite these texts as Íslendingabók, Kristni saga and Njála, 
respectively, even though the first two appear in the same book. Page numbers from these editions are 
given alongside chapter numbers of their Íslenzk Fornrit versions: Jakob Benediktsson, ed., 
Íslendingabók Landnámabók, Íslenzk Fornrit I (Reykjavík: Hið Íslenzka Fornritafélag, 1968); Sigurgeir 
Steingrímsson, Ólafur Halldórsson and Peter Foote, eds., Biskupa Sögur I, Íslenzk Fornrit XV 
(Reykjavík: Hið Íslenzka Fornritafélag, 2003), and Einar Ól Sveinsson, ed., Brennu-Njáls saga, Íslenzk 
Fornit XII (Reykjavík: Hið Íslenzka Fornritafélag, 1954), respectively. 
9 William Ian Miller, Bloodtaking and Peacemaking Feud, Law and Society in Saga Iceland (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1990), 45. Miller‘s persuasive full defence of the (careful) use of 
sagas as evidence can be found in 43-76 of that same book. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
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 A final, linguistic point: unlike in English, uniformity of tenses was unnecessary 
in Old Norse. In almost any Old Norse prose text, the tense switches between past and 
present frequently, sometimes even within the same sentence. Nonetheless, in most 
cases the required sense is abundantly clear. Still, I ask that readers unused to Old Norse 
forgive what might otherwise seem peculiar. 
 
1.3 – Rawlsian Exposition and Terms 
 
People in modern democratic societies hold all sorts of competing views about very 
fundamental matters. Widespread disagreement about religious, philosophical and 
moral issues results in pluralism: the existence of a range of incommensurable general 
and comprehensive doctrines. Importantly, this pluralism does not just come about 
because people can be irrational, ill-informed or capricious, but because reasonable 
people are capable of disagreement. Reasonable people can disagree about such matters 
because there are burdens of judgement: evidence can be ambiguous, our 
understandings can depend to some extent upon the specifics of our life experiences, 
and so on.
12
 There obtains, then, the fact of reasonable pluralism, which, as the 
inevitable result of the free operation of human reason under free institutions, is a 
―permanent fact‖ which can be understood to be ―rooted … in human nature itself‖.13 
The fact of reasonable pluralism makes the project of ordering society more difficult, 
because of fundamental divisions between citizens. 
This difficulty posed by the fact of reasonable pluralism is at the heart of John 
Rawls‘ Political Liberalism and its fundamental question. Rawls thinks that the answer 
                                                 
12 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 56-7. 
13 Ibid., 144; Charles R. Beitz, ―Rawls‘s Law of Peoples,‖ Ethics 110, no. 4 (July 2000), 671. 
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lies in the idea of an ―overlapping consensus.‖14 He hopes that there is sufficient 
common ground between citizens, in spite of reasonable pluralism, on which a strictly 
political conception of justice might stand. To be subject to an overlapping consensus, 
this conception must not stray into territory where there is room for reasonable 
disagreement. The hope is that, in spite of the number of conflicting beliefs that people 
hold, all citizens will be able to affirm the same political conception of justice, even if 
they do so for different reasons. In this way, if the ideas of all people were graphed, it 
might look like a (rather complicated) Venn diagram, with the public political 
conception of justice in the middle. It seems very unlikely that there is any actual 
overlap at all between doctrines, particularly of the sort for which Rawls hopes. Even 
definitionally, the idea of overlapping consensus seems far-fetched: why should one 
assume that incommensurable doctrines have any common ground at all, especially 
sufficient for such a major issue? As Rawls himself notes, the ―most intractable 
struggles … are for the sake of the highest things‖.15 
To counter this problem, Rawls allows himself some extra material. He begins 
his article, ―The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus‖, with the statement: ―The aims of 
political philosophy depend on the society it addresses.‖16 It is apparent that the sort of 
society Rawls is addressing is a modern democracy, since he explicitly states his 
intention to ―start within the tradition of democratic thought‖.17 Implicit in the public 
political culture of a constitutional democracy are three interconnected ideas: the 
fundamental idea of society as ―a fair system of cooperation over time, from one 
                                                 
14 Introduced in John Rawls, ―The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus,‖ Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 
7, no. 1 (1987): 1-25, and then further explained in Rawls, Political Liberalism, 133-72, though the term 
first appears with a different sense in A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 
388. 
15 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 4. 
16 Rawls, ―Overlapping Consensus,‖ 1. 
17 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 18. 
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generation to the next‖ and two associated basic ideas, first of citizens ―as free and 
equal persons‖ and secondly of ―a well-ordered society as a society effectively regulated 
by a political conception of justice‖.18 Collectively, I refer to these three ideas as the 
organising ideas. Rawls conceives of his argument as the natural teasing out of the 
implications of these organising ideas. To summarise it as technically as possible, then: 
Rawls begins with a particular type of society in mind, in which certain organising 
ideas may be taken as universally held, and therefore uncontroversial. Based solely 
upon these ideas held in common, it is possible to argue conclusively that a public 
political conception of justice capable of gaining the support of an overlapping 
consensus of reasonable general and comprehensive doctrines is the most appropriate 
answer to the fundamental question. Overlapping consensus becomes more realistic 
with this proviso in mind: people will want to live in a well-ordered society, and so will 
want to establish a political conception of justice. Recognising each other‘s 
reasonableness and rationality and the validity of the conflicting views of others, and 
knowing that society is to be fair, fellow citizens will seek to justify the terms of their 
cooperation with each other. The force of these desires, which citizens have qua 
citizens, should help to establish an overlapping consensus even when no desire to do so 
necessarily arises out of citizens‘ own broader beliefs.19 
I end this introduction with the explanation and justification of a few key terms. 
I have chosen the term notion of justice (hereafter NoJ) to differentiate it from a public 
political conception of justice (hereafter PPCoJ). In the Commonwealth, there was no 
PPCoJ in the sense that Rawls would require. Such a conception must be completely 
explicit, clear, perfectly elucidated and so on. Further, its justificatory basis must be 
                                                 
18 Ibid., 14. 
19 Rawls, ―Overlapping Consensus,‖ 17. 
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open for public scrutiny. I do not contend that these qualities characterised the Icelandic 
NoJ. Nonetheless, it was present, and its substantive content perhaps broader and deeper 
than the organising ideas implicit in the public political culture of a modern 
constitutional democracy. To clarify, then: I do not claim that there was a publicly 
debated, explicit set of principles to which all people in the Commonwealth adhered. 
There was no public political conception with the support of an overlapping consensus 
in the strict Rawlsian sense. Undeniably, if the principles of a public political 
conception of justice are to fulfil their proper function, they will have to be explicitly 
stated and perfectly clear. The absence of philosophical debate, however, does not 
necessarily reflect the absence of shared ideas. It does not mean that the shared 
conception is vague, either. I return to these matters later. 
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Chapter Two: Commonwealth 
 
2.1 – The Conversion and its Explanations 
 
In this chapter, I succinctly outline the generally accepted story of the Commonwealth‘s 
conversion. Within this story, there are two elements in particular that are difficult to 
explain. Focusing upon these two elements, I discuss the ways in which traditional 
explanations are deficient. I then leave them aside briefly, and argue that there existed in 
the Commonwealth a widely held NoJ. This NoJ was composed of a small, 
interconnected group of shared understandings, which collectively enabled the 
Commonwealth to function without civil strife. After outlining the content of the NoJ 
and providing evidence that is was prevalent, I move on to explaining the role that the 
NoJ played in the conversion. In the subsequent chapter, I discuss the implications of 
my argument regarding the NoJ, and why it may be of philosophical use and interest. 
Accounts of the conversion of Iceland indicate that the process began with the 
arrival of missionaries from Norway.
20
 The missionaries succeeded in making some 
conversions, but also met with hostility. Upon returning to Norway, their report of how 
their missionary efforts had gone led the Norwegian king, Óláfr Tryggvason, to 
imprison all Icelanders in his kingdom, with the intention of killing them. Two 
Icelanders volunteered to renew the conversion efforts, however, so King Óláfr relented. 
These two Icelanders returned home and began trying to convert their countrymen. 
Shortly thereafter, the Alþingi for the year 1000AD approached. It was said that the 
                                                 
20 Íslendingabók, ch. 7, pp. 7-9; Kristni saga, chs. 1-13, pp. 35-50. 
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pagan faction had gathered together with weapons and intended to attack the Christians. 
Ari Þorgilsson‘s Íslendingabók reads: 
[The Christians] send word to the assembly that all their supporters should 
come to meet them, because they had heard that their adversaries intended 
to keep them from the assembly field by force. … And then they rode to the 
assembly, and their kinsmen and friends had come to meet them beforehand 
as requested. And the heathens thronged together fully armed, and it came 
so close to them fighting that no one could foresee which way it would go.
21
 
 
Yet both sides restrained themselves, and there was no fighting. The two factions then 
declared themselves legally sundered from each other. The Christian faction appointed 
Síðu-Hallr as their new lawspeaker, and asked him to announce the law for them. Síðu-
Hallr then asked the original lawspeaker, whose name was Þorgeirr, to declare the law 
on behalf of both factions. Þorgeirr, the sources claim, hid himself under a cloak for a 
full day and then elicited oaths from both sides that they would honour his decision.
22
 
He then made a speech about the value of legal unity before proclaiming the law: 
… that all people should be Christian, and that those in this country who had 
not yet been baptised should receive baptism; but the old laws should stand 
as regards the exposure of children and the eating of horse-flesh. People had 
the right to sacrifice in secret, if they wished, but it would be punishable by 
the lesser outlawry if witnesses were produced.
23
 
 
Despite whatever resentment may have been felt by the pagans at this outcome, both 
factions accepted the decision and lived by it. The nation became Christianised 
completely, with the result that ―a few years later‖ the last vestiges of ―heathen 
provisions‖ were declared unlawful, ―like the others.‖24 The two occurrences which 
are difficult to explain are the two which have been directly quoted from Íslendingabók. 
                                                 
21 Íslendingabók, ch. 7, p. 8. 
22 Íslendingabók, Kristni saga and Njála all agree about the hiding under the cloak, but only Njála, ch. 
105, p. 181, records the extraction of oaths and pledges from both sides. 
23 Íslendingabók, ch. 7, p. 9. 
24 Íslendingabók, ch. 7, p. 9. 
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It is surprising that fighting did not break out before the Alþing, and perhaps even more 
surprising that the pagan faction accepted a legal decision which jeopardised their 
beliefs. I focus on the traditional explanations of these two events in turn. 
 Regarding the first event, Siân Grønlie writes that there are ―many plausible 
suggestions as to why fighting did not break out‖, listing in particular ―that the 
Christians were more numerous than the heathens had expected, that news of Icelandic 
hostages in Norway prevented it or that moderate men on both sides intervened‖.25 I 
contend that these accounts (the deterrent explanation, the hostage explanation and the 
intervention explanation, as I call them) are not quite as satisfactory as Grønlie believes. 
Of course, it is impossible in the circumstances to form a remotely reliable estimation of 
the numbers present in each of the factions. At any rate, it is at the very least highly 
implausible, given the time frame of the conversion and the size and difficult terrain of 
Iceland, that the pagan faction might have been greatly outnumbered by the Christians. 
Jón Hnefill Aðalsteinsson argues convincingly that, at best, ―Christianity had gained a 
firm foothold in the country a year before the Conversion, but … the opposition against 
it was active and powerful‖ and the ―majority of Icelanders were heathen.‖26 Surely, 
though, there would have to be a large margin of difference between the sizes of the two 
forces for the deterrent explanation to work. In Njála, a fight breaks out at the Alþing 
between two roughly equal (and large) groups over the result of a prosecution for a 
burning.
27
 There, the magnitude and equality of the forces does not serve as a sufficient 
deterrent.
28
 There is a great deal of hot blood over the court case, because of the 
                                                 
25 Grønlie, Íslendingabók – Kristni saga, p. 25, n. 70. 
26 Jón Hnefill Aðalsteinsson, Under the Cloak: The Acceptance of Christianity in Iceland with Particular 
Reference to the Religious Attitudes Prevailing at the Time (Uppsala: Borgströms Tryckeri AB, Motala, 
1978), 77. 
27 Njála, ch. 145, pp. 270-4. 
28 Njála, ch. 145, pp. 270-4. 
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popularity of the burned man and the atrocious nature of the crime. Presumably, the 
depth of public feeling about the issue was sufficient to override whatever other 
concerns there may have been. To suggest that the same would not apply for the conflict 
of religions is absurd. Whatever reasons the two factions may have had for not fighting, 
cowardice or squeamishness cannot be counted among them. 
 The news of Icelandic hostages in Norway is a difficult explanation to examine. 
The account in Íslendingabók states that, upon hearing of the treatment of his 
missionaries in Iceland,  
Óláfr … determined to have those of our countrymen who were there in the 
east maimed or killed for it. But that same summer, Gizurr and Hjalti 
travelled there from out here and got the king to release them ….29  
 
As Kristni saga narrates: 
Then the king became so angry that he had many Icelanders seized and put 
in chains, threatened some with death and some with maiming, and others 
were stripped of their possessions.
30
 
 
When Gizurr made appeal to the king in this account, he responded by saying: 
‗Everyone shall have peace, if you and Hjalti pledge that Christianity will 
make progress in Iceland. But I will take hostage those men who seem to me 
most highly bred among the Icelanders until it is found out which way this 
matter will go.‘31 
 
Once Gizurr and Hjalti made their pledge, though, ―all the Icelanders who were there 
were released and baptised.‖32 It seems a major flaw in this proposed explanation that 
two of the main sources which record the conversion indicate that all the Icelanders who 
had been imprisoned were released before the conversion occurred. Concern for hostage 
kinsmen can hardly have been an important factor, when there appear to have been 
none. Again, it is possible that the sources are inaccurate or incomplete, or that the 
                                                 
29 Íslendingabók, ch. 7, p. 8. 
30 Kristni saga, ch. 11, p. 46. 
31 Ibid.,ch. 11, p. 47. 
32 Ibid. 
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converted Icelanders still in Norway were in a rather precarious position in spite of their 
release. Nonetheless, there is no indication at any point that most Icelanders were aware 
of what had occurred in Norway, or that they were influenced by it if they did know. It 
also seems to be a large conjecture to say that it would have swayed them, too. It could 
be just as likely that knowledge of a foreign king‘s threats simply would have hardened 
resistance, given the ―evident nationalism‖ that manifests itself in the conversion 
accounts.
33
 After all, Gizurr apparently told Óláfr that his chief missionary ―behaved … 
in a very unruly manner …, and people thought it hard to take that from a foreigner.‖34 
The hostage explanation seems unconvincing. 
 The claim that the parties refrained from fighting because of the intervention of 
moderate men also seems problematic. The peacemaker held a curious position in 
Commonwealth society. On the one hand, peacemakers could endanger themselves by 
acting as go-betweens between hostile groups. One group might easily come to the 
conclusion that the peacemaker, by not wholly supporting them in feuds or other 
conflicts, was more of an enemy than a friend. In Njála, the Njálssons eventually kill 
their foster brother, Hǫskuldr Hvítanessgoði, who has previously acted as a peacemaker 
in a series of their disputes.
35
 Despite the malicious influence of Mǫrðr Valgarðsson, 
who helps to turn the Njálssons against Hǫskuldr, the motivation behind this killing can 
seem baffling. Since the Njálssons and Hǫskuldr were once on such good terms that 
they ―never disagreed about anything‖ and their friendship was ―fervent‖, one would 
conjecture that Mǫrðr‘s conniving would have been insufficient to turn the Njálssons, 
                                                 
33 Siân Duke, ―Kristni saga and its Sources: Some Revaluations,‖ Saga-Book of the Viking Society for 
Northern Research, 25, part 4 (2001): 365. 
34 Kristni saga, ch. 11, p. 46. 
35 Njála, ch. 111, p. 188. 
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usually stalwart in friendship, against their foster brother.
36
 William Ian Miller provides 
a powerful and convincing explanation of their conduct by examining the hostility that 
Hǫskuldr engendered by acting as a go-between.37 Given the danger that a peacemaker 
could potentially face, stepping into the middle of a religious conflict is unlikely to have 
been an effective manoeuvre. 
 On the other hand, intercession could be effective in some extreme cases. In 
Njála, as mentioned previously, a full-scale fight erupted at the Alþing.
38
 The two 
parties in this fight were only reconciled when Síðu-Hallr offered to let his son – who 
had only been an innocent bystander, but had been killed nonetheless – lie without 
compensation, if only they would set aside their differences.
39
 In the end, after the 
settlement was established, the landsmenn each made a personal donation as 
compensation to go to Síðu-Hallr, which amounted to four times the usual amount.
40
 
The fame of such events indicates that, in momentous circumstances, the role of an 
effective peacemaker, though necessarily involving a sacrifice of some kind, was widely 
lauded. Therefore, if the intercession of moderate men were responsible for the lack of 
religious violence at the Alþing, it would be reasonable to expect the names of those 
men to have been recorded. 
 Admittedly, it is possible, however unlikely, that there were moderate men 
whose intervention succeeded in preventing the eruption, and that their intercession was 
never recorded. Kristni saga does say that ―there were some who wanted to prevent 
                                                 
36 Ibid., ch. 94, p. 167; ch. 97, p. 167. 
37 William Ian Miller, ―The Central Feud in Njáls Saga,‖ in Sagas of the Icelanders: a Book of Essays, ed. 
John Tucker (London: Garland Publishing, 1989), 318. 
38 Njála, ch. 145, pp. 270-4. 
39 Ibid., ch. 145, pp. 275-6. 
40 Ibid., ch. 145, p. 278. 
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trouble, even though they were not Christians.‖41 This statement reads as a qualification 
of the condemnation of the pagans, though, than as an explanation. If it were because of 
these people that fighting was prevented, the saga author might be expected to say so 
directly. At any rate, such intervention can only accomplish so much. For it to work, the 
parties to whom one appeals to avoid bloodshed must already be partially willing to do 
so. They must acknowledge the soundness of any argument for peace that is presented 
them. In other words, even if the explanation of the intervention of moderate men is 
true, it is insufficient. To all intents and purposes, the willingness of the parties to be 
persuaded by arguments from the NoJ that were posed to them by intercessors amounts 
to much the same thing as their own possession of those ideas. Any argument for peace 
that could be made would necessarily have to butt up against the desire for religious 
bloodshed. It is immaterial who posed these arguments. All that matters is that, when 
they were made, their force exceeded the compulsion to fight. The traditional 
explanations of the first occurrence, then, are insufficient. 
 Regarding the second occurrence, none of the sources makes any mention of any 
resistance on the part of the pagans. Presumably because the lawspeaker Þorgeirr was 
pagan himself, Njála mentions that the ―heathens considered that they had been greatly 
deceived, but the new law took effect and everybody became Christian in this land.‖42 
This brief and economical statement is the full extent of any mention of pagan 
rebelliousness, suggesting that there was no resistance worth narrating. Like Ari 
Þorgilsson himself, Siân Grønlie is curiously silent on the issue of why the pagans were 
so willing to comply. Strömbäck goes so far as to say that the acceptance of Christianity 
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―leaves us perplexed, mystified.‖43 As before, I shall list possible explanations and then 
dismiss them in turn. The first relies upon the significance of the action of hiding under 
the cloak, while the second depends upon the unwillingness of the pagan faction to 
break their pledges. I call these explanations the cloak explanation and the oath 
explanation, respectively. 
 Jón Hnefill Aðalsteinsson gives the cloak explanation a long and thorough 
defence.
44
 He argues that Þorgeirr‘s action of hiding under the cloak without speaking 
for such a long time was a religious ritual, essentially an act of divination through 
communication with spirits.
45
 This action would have been of particular significance for 
the pagans, and may therefore have been a major element in their compliance with his 
decision.
46
 This explanation is brilliantly elucidated and quite plausible. The first 
obvious objection to it, which mirrors the objection to the oath explanation below, is the 
paradox of one religious belief denouncing itself. On reflection, though, the objection is 
weak in this case. Polytheistic beliefs are often not organised into a coherent and 
interdependent system. The Æsir could not be the source of an instruction to cease 
worshipping the Æsir; but the landvættir could, and so on. Particularly given Þorgeirr‘s 
provisions regarding private pagan worship, it seems possible that the pagans could 
view the acceptance of Christianity as not wholly incompatible with the entirety of their 
beliefs. 
 The reason why the cloak explanation ultimately does not seem entirely 
satisfying is that it would be incongruous for the religious ritual in question to have the 
sort of significance the cloak explanation requires. Duelling is a good example. While 
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45 Ibid., 103-25. 
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other medieval societies may have viewed the outcome of a trial by combat as the 
choice of God and therefore a clear indication of the truth of a matter, there is little 
reason to believe that this sort of thinking existed in Iceland. Certainly, duels were legal 
in the early stages of the Commonwealth, but I would suggest that they were not seen as 
anything more than, at best, an impartial and final means of adjudication when all other 
means failed: in Njála, for example, advisors often talk their friends out of duels 
because of the fearsomeness of the opponent, with no appeal to whether or not the cause 
is just.
47
 Icelanders, it seems, valued legal process, fairness and so on, rather than appeal 
to metaphysical considerations. Jón Hnefill Aðalsteinsson tries to get around this issue 
in Under the Cloak by providing a series of examples to demonstrate that there was 
widespread cultural respect for this sort of divination.
48
 One of these examples is Njáll 
himself, whose advice is always good and effective, and who often appears to indulge in 
this activity.
49
 Advice giving, though, is very much measured by its effectiveness. It is 
not that merely that Njáll seems to engage in some sort of respected ritual that makes 
his advice worth following. Instead, it is the fact that his advice is always good. Bare 
ritual is insufficient. In fact, it is not only insufficient, but perhaps unnecessary. There is 
effectively an opposite character to Njáll in Njála: Mǫrðr Valgarðsson. Njáll is the wise 
and benevolent giver of advice, while Mǫrðr is the manipulative and cunning schemer. 
Mǫrðr does not appear to participate in any of these rituals, yet his advice always proves 
effective.
50
 It seems most reasonable, then, to think that the landsmenn would have 
assessed Þorgeirr‘s decision on its own merits and from their own standpoints, rather 
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20 
 
than accepting it for spiritual reasons. On the whole, the cloak explanation, though 
ingenious, does not suffice. 
 The oath explanation seems massively flawed. The first reason for rejecting it is 
that only Njála mentions the lawspeaker‘s solicitation of prior allegiance to the 
decision.
51
 Even if oaths were given, however, it seems reasonable to assume that oaths 
about religion lose their force. For example, Hrafnkell in Hrafnkels saga Freysgoða 
supposedly acts ―with the belief that nothing good comes to those men who bring 
solemn oaths upon their own heads‖.52 Oaths have, in other words, a metaphysical 
force. An oath taken by a pagan, however, to convert to Christianity, cannot be fulfilled 
without betraying what makes it worth fulfilling in the first place. To reject a belief 
system on the basis of a motivation that arises from within that belief system is 
inherently paradoxical. Of course, it is possible that landsmenn felt a personal, moral 
commitment to their pledges irrespective of any superstition, in much the same way that 
an atheist can believe in a moral obligation to fulfil promises. The explanation still fails, 
though. In many respects, the manner of the decision mimics a dispute resolution more 
than a matter of law. The role played by the lawspeaker was very specific.
53
 The 
lawspeaker was able to clarify laws where they were unclear, and to consult legal 
experts for assistance.
54
 Where no law existed, law was created by the law council, not 
unilaterally by the lawspeaker.
55
 The decision taken by the lawspeaker most clearly 
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resembles the way in which private disputes were often submitted to third-party 
arbitration.
56
 There, the parties to the dispute gave pledges to honour whatever decision 
the arbiter made.
57
 Nonetheless, they did so on the understanding that the arbiter‘s 
impartiality would make the decision fair, much like, when they awarded self-
judgement to an opponent, they expected him not to take advantage of it. The sagas 
demonstrate that individuals were willing to accept an outcome within a certain margin 
of their expectations: they might accept a decision which they felt unfair, so long as 
they did not feel it was too unfair.
58
 When they did, they rarely felt compelled to honour 
it: Miller goes so far as to differentiate the ―noncomplier [who] had never quite accepted 
the validity‖ of a settlement from the ―settlement breaker‖ himself.59 The pagans appear 
to have felt cheated by the decision, and could easily have claimed that the settlement 
was unfair.
60
 If so, it would have been in keeping with the cultural norms of arbitration 
for them to find a way around or out of it. Whatever oaths may or may not have been 
taken appear to have no explanatory force. 
 
2.2 – The Notion of Justice 
 
Since the traditional accounts do not seem satisfactory, I now elucidate the idea of the 
NoJ. The group of five shared understandings which together constitute the NoJ can be 
stated as follows: first, it is a desirable feature of intra-societal interaction that it be 
publicly viewed as legitimate. Second, violence is to be avoided where possible. Third, 
people are to adhere to a (limited) form of the principle of discursive respect. In the 
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Commonwealth context, I take discursive respect to mean an eagerness to arrive at a 
shared understanding of appropriate conduct, social hierarchy and so on. Fourth, 
landsmenn are free and equal. Fifth, landsmenn and goðar are to conduct themselves 
with hóf (―moderation in the seeking of personal power‖).61 The precise meaning of 
each of these shared understandings is unfolded alongside the evidence that 
demonstrates their widespread acceptance in the Commonwealth. 
 The first shared understanding is the most obvious. There is even an argument 
for suggesting that public acceptance of the legitimacy of one‘s interactions is 
universally desirable, and not merely a feature of a certain kind of political culture. 
Rawls, for example, not only suggests that citizens seek to justify their actions to fellow 
citizens, but that public perception of the worthiness of one‘s rational plan of life, of 
one‘s ability to adhere to one‘s own principles and so on is an integral part of the 
primary good of self-respect.
62
 Daniel McDermott also theorises that rights have two 
kinds of value: the value of the thing to which one has a right, and the value of the 
public recognition of the right itself.
63
 Regardless of the accuracy of these views, which 
are essentially claims about human moral psychology, it is undeniable that this 
understanding was prevalent in the Commonwealth. Miller mentions ―the law‘s 
synonymity with legitimacy‖, at least in the speech of saga characters, and it is tempting 
to treat them as intrinsically linked in the Commonwealth.
64
 Given the lack of executive 
power in Iceland, law served little practical purpose. In Hrafnkels saga Freysgoða, for 
example, a man named Sámr has just successfully outlawed his enemy, Hrafnkell, who 
is much more powerful than him. Sámr‘s influential ally, Þorgeirr, then asks him, 
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laughing, how he thinks the court case went, asking: ―Do you think you have made any 
progress?‖65 The act of outlawing someone is of no practical consequence, as Þorgeirr‘s 
jesting question reveals. Its purpose, then, must have been to establish legitimacy. That 
skilfulness at law (being lǫgkænn) was a desirable quality receiving frequent mention in 
the sagas demonstrates that lawfulness, and hence legitimacy, was valued in its own 
right, even though laws without any force to defend them amount to little other than 
codified norms. 
 That violence is to be avoided where possible might seem a trivial and obvious 
point, but its significance will become clearer, particularly in the next chapter. Partly, it 
is a corollary of the first shared understanding, because in a society without any 
executive power, personal strength is the final court of appeal. To resist the urge to take 
everything to this final court was seen as a good quality, since personal strength is not a 
justification. That duelling was eventually outlawed may also seem indicative of the 
acceptance of this idea.
66
 Legitimacy is valuable, and cannot be established by force, 
and so force is undesirable. Since there is evidence to suggest that the first shared 
understanding existed, little extra is needed to show that the second did, too. 
Nonetheless, I mention one, briefly: Hrafnkels saga Freysgoða. There, it is said that 
Hrafnkell ―fought in many duels and offered compensation to no man, because no one 
ever got compensation from him, no matter what he did.‖67 The saga does not relate, 
however, whether or not Hrafnkell was right or wrong to fight in those duels. It is 
simply taken as a sign of an overbearing character that his position is defended always 
with martial skill, and never legitimised. 
                                                 
65 Hrafnkels saga Freysgoða, ch. 4, p. 74, line 517. 
66 Byock, Viking Age Iceland, 19. 
67 Hrafnkels saga Freysgoða, ch. 2, p. 60, lines 38-40. 
24 
 
 That discursive respect is important is an interesting shared understanding. It is 
desirable to reach agreement with others on such matters, to justify the form of 
interaction with them, and so on, even when compromise is necessary to establish this 
agreement. The prevalence of this shared understanding may be traced back to the 
genesis of Icelandic law. Ari Þorgilsson writes in Íslendingabók that ―an Easterner 
called Úlfljótr first brought laws ought here from Norway … and they were … for the 
most part modelled on how the laws of the Gulaþing were at the time‖.68 Byock notes, 
on the other hand, that Ari, being of Norwegian descent, may have overemphasised the 
influence of Norway in the creation of Icelandic law.
69
 As evidence, he cites the fact 
that ―the laws of the Gulaþing and the Free State‘s Grágás show few consistent 
similarities.‖70 Moreover, it is unlikely that laws were imported wholesale from 
Norway, given that so many settlers were not actually Norwegian. Many of the settlers 
―had previously settled in the Hebrides, Orkney, Ireland, and Scotland.‖71 Miller notes 
that there were also ―an indeterminate number of Celts, as slaves, concubines, and 
wives.‖72 Some of these Celts may have been of greater importance than Miller thinks, 
as Byock suggests by pointing out the existence of a large number of place names which 
are formed from Irish male names.
73
 It seems likely that the unique circumstances of 
Iceland‘s settlement necessitated a process of negotiation, compromise and debate 
which in turn gave rise to the unique nature of Icelandic law. Discursive respect also 
becomes important because of the next shared understanding. 
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 Landsmenn were, generally speaking, free and equal in the Commonwealth. 
There were essentially only three ranks: slaves, bœndr and goðar. Of course, in practice 
there were many rungs in society, just as there tend to be vast inequalities of class in a 
modern constitutional democracy despite each citizen technically possessing identical 
legal rights. The existence of slavery in the Commonwealth is an unfortunate fact about 
it, certainly. Most of these people, though, would not have been understood (and 
perhaps would not have understood themselves) as Icelanders, generally having been 
captured on raids or bought in foreign slave markets.
74
 It is consistent with this account 
that slavery died out in Iceland around the time that the Viking Age ended.
75
 
Fascinatingly, though, the difference between bœndr and goðar is minimal. In other 
Germanic societies, people were evaluated according to their class differences, as 
reflected in their legal codes regarding restitution. In late Anglo-Saxon England, for 
example, the amount of compensation to be paid for a churl was a sixth of the amount 
for a thane, and so on.
76
 In Iceland, however, all free people were owed equal 
payment.
77
 Of course, there were evaluations made based upon character, perceived 
desert and so on, such that a popular or well-liked man might receive more 
compensation than an overbearing troublemaker. There was, however, no technical 
legal differentiation between classes, or between farmers and chieftains. In the 
Commonwealth period a treaty was even established with Norway to establish the equal 
legal rights of all Icelanders abroad.
78
 Icelanders were fiercely proud of their non-
monarchical status, and saga authors seem to relish scenes in which Icelanders are 
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criticised for their perceived arrogance in the face of authority.
79
 With no king, there is 
no higher secular authority to which one can appeal to resolve disputes. Citizens must 
evaluate everything with reference to each other. 
 The fifth shared understanding, regarding the desirability of hóf, may perhaps be 
seen as the culmination of the previous five, and also a natural result of the kind of 
society the Commonwealth was. To value legitimacy and not to rely solely upon 
violence are integral parts of the political notion of moderation, and a natural 
consequence of respecting one‘s fellows as free and equal, and vital for showing 
discursive respect. Hóf is a multi-faceted concept which appears to contain all of the 
others, and its positive evaluation in the Commonwealth is completely beyond 
reasonable doubt. There remains a certain quantity of contention about whether hóf is 
strictly a political value or whether it extends more broadly into morality in general. I 
avoid that question here and simply assume the former, since the latter assumes the 
former but is of no added use for the political discussion at hand. 
 Together, these five shared understandings constitute the NoJ, whose role in the 
conversion can now be explained. The existence of the NoJ explains both the non-
violence at the Alþing and the willingness of the pagans to abide by the decision against 
them. Rebellion against the lawspeaker‘s decision would have conflicted with the first 
shared understanding of the value of legal legitimacy. Denying the Christians access to 
the Alþing in the first place would also have made the pagan victory the result only of 
brute strength, not merit. The second shared understanding would have added a second 
level of undesirability to the prospect of fighting or resisting, since holding onto 
paganism would have entailed widespread violence and strife. The desire for peace and 
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cohesion triumphed. The third shared understanding would have caused the pagans to, 
at the least, give the Christians the chance to be heard, and to ―state their case‖ as well 
as possible.
80
 The equality and freedom of landsmenn guaranteed by the fourth shared 
understanding would have made them loath to deny Christians access to the law. The 
fifth and final shared understanding, regarding hóf, would cause the idea of using 
martial superiority to seem repugnant to the landsmenn, especially given the large role 
played in the country‘s settlement by the need to escape political violence.81 The idea, 
then, is that the currency of these ideas in the culture of the Commonwealth was 
sufficient to outweigh what must have been strong conflicting desires to defend the old 
religion. 
 By way of concluding this chapter, I wish to defend my account against a 
possible objection. It might be suggested that the fact that fighting was even a remote 
possibility demonstrates that the NoJ was ineffective or absent. One might expect, if the 
NoJ existed as I have argued, that the pagan faction would not even have bothered to 
arm itself. In response, I point out that it was a common feature of political competition 
in the Commonwealth for people to display the size and fearsomeness of their retinue.
82
 
By demonstrating that one had an extensive network of support, one was more likely to 
bring about a favourable outcome, warning opponents of one‘s political clout. The en 
masse non-violent confrontation between the two factions can therefore be seen, on my 
account, as little more than a hostile display. It does not necessarily follow that there 
was ever actually a genuine, premeditated intention to fight. As such, the fact that 
fighting nearly broke out is not indicative of the absence of the NoJ. 
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Chapter Three: Conceptual Links 
 
In the subsequent chapter, I intend to make use of the example of the Commonwealth 
when making a series of arguments about Rawls‘ political philosophy. It may appear 
that the workings of a unique but short-lived medieval political entity have little to do 
with the issues abounding in a modern constitutional democracy. As such, my approach 
requires a solid justification. Therefore, in this short chapter I attempt to demonstrate 
that the Commonwealth can be pertinent to philosophical discussion. I leave aside for 
the moment the question of whether or not the Commonwealth constitutes a useful 
example: this question can only be resolved by evaluating the success or value of the 
arguments I make in the subsequent chapter. For now, I need only show that there is 
nothing about the Commonwealth which necessarily invalidates its use as an example. It 
would be invalid if, for example, the polities in question are simply too different to be 
compared. I therefore attempt to argue towards two conclusions in this chapter: first, 
that there are relevant similarities between the Commonwealth and a modern 
constitutional democracy, and second, that where the two differ, the differences are 
philosophically unimportant. 
 I begin by reiterating the most important characteristics of the society about 
which Rawls writes. The most fundamental feature of such a society is the fact of 
reasonable pluralism: the existence of a variety of incommensurable but equally 
reasonable general and comprehensive doctrines.
83
 This feature is the result of human 
reason at work under enduring free institutions which do not coercively bring about 
allegiance to any particular doctrine.
84
 The other fundamental feature of the society 
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discussed by Rawls is the prevalence of the organising ideas of society as a fair system 
of social cooperation from one generation to the next, citizens as free and equal and a 
well-ordered society as a society effectively regulated by a political conception of 
justice.
85
 Modern constitutional democracies supposedly possess these two features. 
 The Commonwealth also possessed these features to a degree sufficient to make 
it relevant. The fact of reasonable pluralism obtained in a middle period, before the 
nation became fully Christianised but after the new religion had started to spread. It 
would certainly be implausible to argue that neither of these religions was reasonable. 
Undoubtedly, political liberalism would hesitate to do so.
86
 Admittedly, though, 
reasonable pluralism in the Commonwealth was rather different to the reasonable 
pluralism encountered under a modern democratic regime, being both temporary and 
limited. It was temporary in that it effectively disappeared after the conversion, and 
limited in that it only existed between two religious doctrines. Neither of these facts 
should detract from the Commonwealth‘s pertinence, however. Indeed, the 
temporariness of the fact of reasonable pluralism in the Commonwealth is of particular 
interest, given that it was no state power to use coercively to bring about renewed 
doctrinal hegemony. The limited nature of the pluralism in the Commonwealth should 
actually be useful, in that it provides both an uncluttered clear and simple example of a 
political conception outweighing broader belief. It does not matter that there now exist 
doctrines which were absent in the Commonwealth. Rawls writes: ―we do not look to 
the comprehensive doctrines that in fact exist and then draw up a political conception 
that strikes some kind of balance of forces between them.‖87 
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 The organising ideas (or ideas sufficiently similar to them) also existed in the 
Commonwealth. Their content, of course, was slightly different, but that does not matter 
for the purpose for which I use the Commonwealth. I shall outline the structure of my 
criticism of Rawls in the next chapter, but for now I note the following: the organising 
ideas are taken for granted in Rawls, in much the same way that the shared 
understandings of the NoJ were not based upon moral philosophy. They simply were 
accepted as a shared fund of ideas. The existence of the NoJ ensured social unity even 
when reasonable pluralism arose, in the form of a split into two competing, 
incompatible but reasonable religious doctrines. Peculiarly, the Commonwealth 
resolved the problem of reasonable pluralism by asserting one faith above the other, but, 
lacking executive power, it did so without coercion. The adherents to the ousted faith 
acknowledged and abided by the decree of conversion, motivated by the moral, political 
content of the NoJ, not by prudential reasons. None of these conclusions mean 
(necessarily) that the content of the NoJ was justified, or that the conversion was a good 
thing, but, as will become clear in the next section, that is exactly the point. The 
Commonwealth, I think, highlights the problems inherent in taking foundational ideas 
for granted. 
 Of course, the Commonwealth did differ in a number of respects: cultural 
hegemony, the fact that it put an end to reasonable pluralism within itself, lack of 
executive power and so on. Insofar as these differences are of any relevance whatsoever 
(unlike, for example, the fact that the landsmenn spoke Old Icelandic rather than 
English), they make the example more useful and more interesting. That there were 
undesirable features of the Commonwealth, such as the institution of slavery, should not 
constitute a major obstacle either, since slaves played no pivotal role in the 
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Commonwealth and do not affect our understanding of its functioning. To refuse to look 
at the Commonwealth on this basis would be to conflate not liking what one sees with 
not thinking there is anything interesting at which to look. There is, then, no major flaw 
inherent in the methodology of using the Commonwealth as an example relevant to 
discussion of the merits of political liberalism. Indeed, the Commonwealth was clearly a 
historical polity which should be of great interest to those familiar with Rawlsian 
political liberalism. It is with these points in mind that I begin the next chapter. In 
particular, I would like to stress that I assume throughout that my account of the 
Commonwealth is correct. 
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Chapter Four: Political Liberalism 
 
4.1 – Assumptions and Interpretations 
 
Imagine a hypothetical ideal society, characterised by the circumstances of justice, the 
fact of reasonable pluralism and the prevalence of the organising ideas. In this society 
there has been established an overlapping consensus on a PPCoJ, affirmed by all 
reasonable citizens. There is no reasonable dissenting voice.
88
 The society is, therefore, 
effectively regulated by a set of principles concerning which all reasonable citizens 
agree. Those principles have been perfectly implemented and the basic structure of 
society fulfils them. As such, no one‘s life is affected by any feature of society which 
she has not freely accepted as just. Together, these features render the ideal society 
well-ordered.
89
 Only unreasonable people find themselves coerced into accepting the 
basic structure, but they are in too small a minority to threaten it. Advancing the idea of 
such a society as an ideal of legitimate social cooperation is the goal of Rawls‘ theory, 
and, indeed, it seems difficult to locate any grounds on which a moral condemnation of 
this society might stand. Though I do not investigate this ideal situation further, I make 
a basic assumption that the ideal society is just. If Rawls attempts nothing deeper than 
outlining the practical and moral merits of such an ideal society in ideal circumstances, 
then, in my view, there is nothing wrong with his theory. I do not think, however, that 
Rawls is aiming for such a restricted goal. 
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 It is vitally important to point out that the evaluation of Rawls‘ theory that I 
undertake in this thesis is premised upon two related interpretations of his view. The 
first interpretation is that Rawls does not think that the conditions necessary for the 
ideal society actually apply in the real world as it currently is, because the organising 
ideas are not firmly and universally held by all citizens. The second interpretation is that 
Rawls is saying something more than the simple claim that the basic structure of this 
ideal society achieves political legitimacy, stability and so on; he is committed to claims 
about how this ideal society might be eventually be achieved, given current real world 
conditions. I shall explain and justify both of these interpretations in turn. 
The first interpretation is based not upon any outright admission of Rawls‘, but 
can be teased out of what he does say. Concerned about the possible objection that his 
view is unrealistic, Rawls provides an account of the way in which an overlapping 
consensus may come to be established in society.
90
 He does so by explaining that, at 
first, adherents of competing doctrines may accept as a prudential compromise (modus 
vivendi) certain liberal principles which lead to a constitutional consensus.
91
 In a 
constitutional consensus, principles ―are accepted simply as principles and not as 
grounded in certain ideas of society and person‖.92 Over time, working within this 
system, citizens will develop these ideas of society and person (the organising ideas) 
and, eventually, an overlapping consensus might be possible.
93
 I examine the 
plausibility of this account later. For now, I think it is important to question exactly why 
Rawls bothers to include it. He is, after all, focusing narrowly upon the problems of 
modern constitutional democracies, and leaves the questions of ―just relations between 
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peoples‖ (e.g. how to handle illiberal societies, etc.) out of Political Liberalism.94 
Therefore, he has no present interest in explaining how an overlapping consensus is 
possible in non-democratic societies. As such, his account must be tied to democratic 
societies, as always, since he writes that the ―aims of political philosophy depend upon 
the society it addresses.‖95 Rawls, though, assumes that the organising ideas are 
implicitly accepted throughout democratic society. If so, they can be taken for granted, 
so why explain how other people might come to share them? The fact that he does so 
indicates that he does not actually think that the organising ideas are quite as prevalent 
as he would like. Rawls appears to have concerns about how broadly and how deeply 
shared these ideas actually are. If so, a full overlapping consensus on the Rawlsian 
model is not yet conceivable, but might be reached in future, if the organising ideas 
become more deeply entrenched. 
The second interpretation of Rawls on which I base my approach is dependent 
upon the first interpretation. Given that, according to the first interpretation, the 
circumstances do not currently exist in which an overlapping consensus can be achieved 
and its legitimacy established, it is important to ask how Rawls‘ theory relates to the 
world as it currently is. This question is, essentially, an issue of what exactly Rawls is 
offering in his theory. If he is simply claiming that, in the right conditions, an 
overlapping consensus would be just and stable, then he may be right, but he is not 
saying much. If that were the case, I think it would be possible to argue convincingly 
that Rawls‘ theory would be of purely academic interest but of no real relevance, and 
therefore he should provide an account explaining and justifying the means of attaining 
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such a goal. Such an argument about Rawls‘ theory is unnecessary, however, because it 
seems that Rawls himself wants his solution to the fundamental question to be more 
than abstract, since it is presented as an answer to a question deeply rooted in the here 
and now of democracies. Rawls also writes of his view that the ―aim … is practical‖.96 
It would be absurd to go on and claim that it is acceptable for a theory with a practical 
aim to be purely hypothetical. Rawls further admits the practicality of his goal when he 
wittily remarks that ―the politician, we say, looks to the next election, the statesman to 
the next generation, and philosophy to the indefinite future.‖97 His omission of this 
statement from Political Liberalism is, I think, an attempt to make it less explicit, rather 
than the result of a shift of perspective. 
Having justified the two interpretations, I assume throughout this section that 
they are correct. Putting the two interpretations together with the main assumption about 
the legitimacy of the ideal society, we can say the following: Rawls thinks that the 
conditions which legitimise an overlapping consensus have not yet been reached, so an 
overlapping consensus, though legitimate in the right circumstances, is not justified here 
and now. This lack of present justification would not be a problem if Rawls were simply 
trying to make a limited, strictly hypothetical point, but I do not think that he is. I think 
that Rawls is trying to explain how a just democratic society can be reached, and so he 
has to provide an account, given that the right conditions do not exist, of how they can 
and why they should be sought. 
 With these interpretations clearly laid out, I turn now to evaluating the 
possibility, justice and stability of the idea of an overlapping consensus of reasonable 
doctrines on a PPCoJ. Possibility refers strictly to whether such a consensus is realistic. 
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The term justice is used in its normal sense: an overlapping consensus is just if we can 
be convinced on moral grounds that it is an appropriate solution to the societal problem 
Rawls identifies. I take stability to possess the sense in which Rawls uses it throughout 
his work: Rawls writes that stability is stability for the right reasons and ―should 
usually be given that meaning in both Theory and PL, as the context determines.‖98 
Stability for the right reasons can be understood as stability for moral rather than 
prudential reasons, or, to put it another way, a type of stability in which citizens over 
time freely affirm the PPCoJ as a moral conception and ―are not simply going along 
with it in view of the balance of political and social forces‖.99 Together, possibility, 
justice and stability constitute the conditions necessary for Rawls‘ proposal to be 
acceptable. A solution, however theoretically appealing, must be rejected on practical 
grounds if it does not meet the criterion of possibility. Similarly, a solution which fails 
to meet the criterion of justice must be rejected on moral grounds. A solution which 
does not ensure stability might not constitute a solution at all: even if it could be 
established, it cannot be guaranteed to persevere. If, on the other hand, an overlapping 
consensus on a PPCoJ is possible, just and stable, then it possesses all of the attributes 
one might reasonably desire in an answer to the fundamental question. My findings are 
mixed. First, I claim, in support of Rawls, that his account achieves possibility. 
Secondly, I argue that his account fails to achieve justice. Thirdly, I contend that, given 
that the justice of the idea of an overlapping consensus is not certain, stability cannot be 
guaranteed. Throughout the discussion, I use the Commonwealth as an empirical 
example, but in a slightly different way each time. 
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4.2 – Possibility 
 
The issue of possibility is prior to those of justice and stability. There is no use 
discussing whether Rawls‘ answer is morally acceptable or stable over time unless one 
has reasonable assurance that it is realistic in the first place. Rawls‘ answer must be 
defended against the charge of utopianism: that it could only work in an ideal world, 
and real world conditions render his solution impossible to realise. As Rawls outlines it, 
the charge of utopianism claims that ―there are not sufficient political, social, or 
psychological forces either to bring about an overlapping consensus (when one does not 
exist), or to render one stable (should one exist).‖100 In other words, the charge of 
utopianism states that Rawls‘ overlapping consensus is not possible. If it is not possible, 
it is of no merit or interest, in accordance with the well-known principle of ‗ought 
implies can‘. Rawls responds to the utopianism charge by explaining how an 
overlapping consensus can be established and maintained.
101
 In this section, I aim to use 
the Commonwealth as evidence in support of Rawls‘ reply to the charge of utopianism, 
but first I provide a more detailed outline of this charge and emphasise its seriousness. 
Rawls assumes that every citizen has ―a comprehensive and a political view.‖102 
Ideally, all citizens would accept the PPCoJ as well as their own particular general and 
comprehensive doctrine. There are a number of ways in which they might do so, 
depending, in part, upon which comprehensive doctrine they happen to accept. In 
Political Liberalism, Rawls briefly explains how certain doctrines might form part of an 
overlapping consensus, but he does so only in a brief manner for the sake of illustrating 
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the concept itself.
103
 A systematic examination of how citizens accepting given 
doctrines might come to affirm justice as fairness or some such PPCoJ would be overly 
time consuming and difficult. Moreover, for Rawls, it would be missing the point, since, 
as noted earlier, ―we do not look to the comprehensive doctrines that in fact exist and 
then draw up a political conception that strikes some kind of balance of forces between 
them.‖104 For this reason, Rawls considers that it is best ―left to citizens individually – 
as part of liberty of conscience – to settle how they think the values of the political 
domain are related to other values in their comprehensive doctrine.‖105 Though there are 
currently many reasonable comprehensive doctrines which actually exist, the quantity of 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines which could appear under free institutions is 
potentially limitless. It is therefore best to leave aside the otherwise Sisyphean task of 
linking them to a given PPCoJ. 
 Nonetheless, it is worth considering the ways in which the categories of 
comprehensive and political can interact. Rawls identifies three options when he writes 
that ―citizens themselves, within the exercise of liberty of thought and conscience, and 
looking to their comprehensive doctrines, view the political conception as derived from, 
or congruent with, or at least not in conflict with, their other values.‖106 These three 
options of derivation, congruence and compatibility (understood in a minimal sense as 
absence of conflict) form a descending order of how interlinked the relationship can be 
between a citizen‘s reasonable doctrine and the PPCoJ. Those citizens who view the 
relationship between the PPCoJ and their comprehensive doctrines as a matter of 
derivation will have twin reasons (arising from within both their political and their 
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comprehensive conceptions) to affirm it. Citizens who view the relationship as a matter 
of congruence will also have two kinds of reasons, but the connection between those 
reasons will not be quite as strong. Last of all, those citizens for whom the PPCoJ 
attains nothing more than compatibility with their comprehensive doctrine will only 
affirm it on its own merits. Though derivation might be motivationally more forceful 
than congruence and then compatibility in turn, it does not follow that compatibility is 
weak. 
 There is a further option, though. In the case of certain comprehensive doctrines, 
there might be incompatibility with the PPCoJ, as Rawls recognises.
107
 Incompatibility 
does not arise simply between the PPCoJ and the ―many unreasonable views‖ that 
necessitate ―the practical task of containing them – like war and disease‖.108 The 
demands of the doctrine of utilitarianism, for example, a reasonable type of doctrine 
which is both fully general and fully comprehensive according to how Rawls defines 
those terms, will frequently conflict with a non-utilitarian PPCoJ.
109
 Simply put, a 
conception of justice according to which the maximisation of utility is not a priority will 
directly conflict with utilitarianism, either entirely or at least in certain instances. 
Similarly, as Paul Weithman discusses, a deeply religious individual might consider ―a 
religiously neutral society as failing in important ways‖.110 Both the utilitarian and the 
deeply religious are expected to be able to be part of an overlapping consensus in spite 
of these differences. Scepticism about the possibility of this requirement is natural. 
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 Rawls‘ initial attempt to deal with this problem is ineffective. After 
acknowledging that doctrines can relate to a PPCoJ by derivation, compatibility or 
incompatibility (he leaves out congruence this time), he simply suggests that, in 
―everyday life‖, citizens ―have not usually decided, or even thought much about, which 
of these cases hold.‖111 He relies upon ―slippage‖, hoping for ways that comprehensive 
doctrines and the PPCoJ might ―cohere loosely‖.112 Essentially, this way around the 
problem of incompatibility merely amounts to hoping that incompatibility will not exist, 
or, if it does, citizens will not notice. It is therefore no solution at all, but a way of 
ignoring the problem. Rawls summarises this line of thought when he writes that ―many 
if not most citizens come to affirm the principles of justice incorporated into their 
constitution and political practice without seeing any particular connection, one way or 
the other, between those principles and their other views.‖113 To affirm or dismiss the 
truth of this claim would require access to non-existent empirical evidence, but, either 
way, it seems inconsistent with Rawls‘ approach. The very reason why a PPCoJ is 
supposedly necessary is that there are such deep divisions between citizens on so many 
issues of great importance. Deeply religious citizens, for example, will have to examine 
carefully the relative merits of the commitments of their faith and the demands of state 
neutrality.
114
 Relying upon ―looseness in our comprehensive views‖ and hoping for the 
best is only going to be an effective strategy in circumstances of such great accord that a 
PPCoJ might be redundant in the first place.
115
 Even if Rawls‘ conjecture is accurate, it 
would drastically alter the picture of overlapping consensus that he so carefully 
sketches: there would no longer be an overlapping consensus of reasonable general and 
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comprehensive doctrines, since those doctrines would essentially become irrelevant. 
There would instead be an overlapping consensus regardless of reasonable doctrines. 
 Of course, Rawls does not leave the issue here, but provides an alternative 
solution to the problem: if citizens notice incompatibility ―between the principles of 
justice and their wider doctrines, then they might very well adjust or revise these 
doctrines rather than reject those principles.‖116 As noted earlier, Rawls provides a 
hypothetical account of the way in which, over time, an overlapping consensus may 
come to be established in a society.
117
 This process essentially depends upon citizens 
accepting, originally as a modus vivendi, a minimal set of constitutional principles 
sufficient to bring about what Rawls calls a constitutional consensus.
118
 A constitutional 
consensus resembles an overlapping consensus but is narrower and shallower, 
essentially being what an overlapping consensus would be if it lacked the organising 
ideas beneath it.
119
 Over time, the organising ideas are developed and a constitutional 
consensus broadens and deepens into an overlapping consensus.
120
 The lynchpin of this 
process is the recognition by citizens that ―the values of the political are very great 
values‖.121 This recognition occurs to citizens ―as the success of political cooperation 
continues‖.122 The strength of this recognition provides the motivational force for the 
alteration, over time, of reasonable general and comprehensive doctrines so that they 
accord better with the PPCoJ and avoid incompatibility. Weithman provides an 
illustrative example of how the notion of incompatibility with a religion can diminish 
over time as adherents who affirm the PPCoJ still cling to their self-understanding as 
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orthodox, and redefine the latter to justify their political affirmations.
123
 Rawls simply 
hopes that political values are strong enough to outweigh whatever might oppose them, 
and considers this account to be ―all that we need say in reply to the objection that the 
idea of overlapping consensus is utopian.‖124 
It is important to know whether or not this account is accurate. As usual, Rawls 
leaves it up to the reader to decide for him- or herself. I entirely accept the account on 
the basis that the Commonwealth example demonstrates conclusively that political 
values can outweigh conflicting comprehensive doctrines: in the year 1000AD, they did. 
The fact that a NoJ is less explicit and less well developed than a PPCoJ might even 
make the example stronger: if a NoJ proved motivationally forceful enough, then a 
PPCoJ should be even more reliably effective, assuming that the organising ideas are 
held with sufficient vigour. Indeed, any incompatibility one can imagine arising in a 
modern context is likely to be weaker than the incompatibility that arose in the 
Commonwealth, since the latter involved wholesale rejection of a doctrine (rather than 
mere violation of one or more of its articles) and left no room for doctrinal alteration 
over time. The crucial point is that, since it is likely to be both frequent and intense, 
incompatibility is a serious problem. The likely frequency and intensity of 
incompatibility means, to borrow a phrase from Stephen Macedo, that there needs to be 
―not merely an overlapping consensus but a consensus that practically overrides all 
competing values.‖125 Nonetheless, the Commonwealth seems to provide good reason 
for being optimistic. The prevalence in society of certain ideas does seem able to 
overcome the issues posed by the widespread conflicts that are likely to arise between 
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comprehensive doctrines and a PPCoJ, so long as the requisite ideas are held strongly 
enough. An overlapping consensus, then, is possible, as the Commonwealth displays. 
 
4.3 – Justice 
 
To reiterate, so far I have accepted four main points. First, I have assumed that an 
overlapping consensus on a PPCoJ is indeed a legitimate solution to the fundamental 
question, under ideal conditions. Second, I have interpreted Rawls as believing that 
those conditions do not currently obtain. Third, I have interpreted Rawls as aiming to 
connect current, real world conditions to his theory of ideal conditions, to explain how 
and why we should progress from the former to the latter. Fourth, I have attempted to 
demonstrate that Rawls‘ explanation of how we could make this progression is correct. 
In this section, I argue that, though the how has been taken care of, the why is 
unanswerable in a way consistent with political liberalism. 
Imagine that a group of people within a constitutional democracy accept the 
organising ideas and all that they entail. They accept the idea of citizens as free and 
equal, and, given the democratic nature of society, they also believe that ―political 
power is the coercive power of free and equal citizens as a corporate body.‖126 For this 
reason, regardless of whatever comprehensive doctrines these people affirm, they think 
that ―it is unreasonable or worse to want to use the sanctions of state power to correct, 
or to punish, those who disagree‖.127 To do so would essentially be to use the power of 
their fellow citizens against them. In other words, these people accept the liberal 
principle of legitimacy, which claims that: 
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… our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in 
accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and 
equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals 
acceptable to their common human reason.
128
 
 
This principle therefore depends upon the organising ideas. As Freeman writes, 
―political legitimacy depends upon acceptance from a particular standpoint, that of 
reasonable and rational free and equal citizens‖.129 It is because of the organising ideas 
that ―we may with perfect consistency hold that it would be unreasonable to use 
political power to enforce our own comprehensive view, which we must, of course, 
affirm as either reasonable or true.‖130 Essentially, if we did attempt to enforce our own 
comprehensive view under those conditions, we would be using collective coercive 
power oppressively while simultaneously acknowledging that we have no greater claim 
than anyone else to doing so. 
According to the principle as Rawls outlines it, an overlapping consensus on a 
PPCoJ is legitimate. Rawls theory is therefore internally consistent, in that (if one can 
forgive the repetition) an overlapping consensus given certain conditions fulfils the 
principle of legitimacy given certain conditions. Outside of those conditions – which, to 
stress the point again, I take Rawls as believing not to obtain currently – there is no 
similar criterion of legitimacy. The organising ideas need to become more entrenched. 
For everyone who does accept the organising ideas, there is a standard according to 
which legitimacy can be judged. Those who do not accept them, however, will not 
accept that standard any more than the ideas on which it stands. Simply, Rawls is 
committed to thinking that the organising ideas could themselves be the subject of 
reasonable disagreement. If not, there would be no need to look to the shared fund of 
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democratic cultural ideas for a firm foundation: he could simply state that anyone who 
does not accept the organising ideas is unreasonable, and then it would not matter 
whether his theory were located within the tradition of democratic thought or not. Rawls 
shies away from providing a definition of what might be termed universal 
reasonableness, utilising instead only a narrow, political variety which is itself based on 
the organising ideas: ―the reasonable is an element of the idea of society as a fair 
system of social cooperation‖ within which the idea of reciprocity is located.131 The 
crucial point is as follows: if accepting the organising ideas and so on were a condition 
of reasonableness, then it would follow that every person who does not accept them is 
unreasonable. Rawls cannot say that, though, because he instead works out the very 
notion of reasonableness in Political Liberalism by building it up from the organising 
ideas. Other possible justificatory tools – such as the principle of reciprocity or the 
liberal principle of legitimacy – are also worked out from the organising ideas. As such, 
their use as potential justifications to support them would be invalid. I do not attribute 
this attempt to Rawls himself, by any means. I simply take note that such an approach 
would be fatally flawed. 
 How are those who accept the organising ideas to justify taking measures to 
ensure others do too, since political liberalism‘s own justificatory tools are ruled out? 
The first option is to invoke a justification from within a comprehensive doctrine, which 
I shall call comprehensive justification. This sort of justification is unacceptable given 
the project of political liberalism, which is based upon the recognition of the fact of 
reasonable pluralism. It would be unreasonable for Rawls, on his own political 
conception of reasonableness, as one who presumably accepts the burdens of judgement 
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and so on, to propose a comprehensive justification to force dissenters to accept ideas 
which in turn make it unreasonable to propose comprehensive justification. Even though 
those who reject the organising ideas would not accept the liberal principle of 
legitimacy that would make coercing them illegitimate, Rawls does. To use a 
comprehensive justification to establish the organising ideas in the hope of justifying 
political liberalism, then, would be to use political power illegitimately according to 
political liberalism itself. 
Though I would avoid attributing this approach to Rawls, I note that Samuel 
Freeman seems to think that Rawls does provide a comprehensive justification in A 
Theory of Justice, and so, along with Political Liberalism, rounds off his account.
132
 To 
quote him at some length:  
If people do not regard themselves as free and equal citizens, nor believe 
that freedom and equality are fundamental political values, then Political 
Liberalism may not be of much interest to them. … Here Rawls‘s critics 
might say that this refusal to address in universal terms people with different 
values who do not think of themselves as free and equal citizens renders 
Rawls‘s argument relativistic, relevant to the political preferences of people 
in a democracy. But clearly Rawls thinks freedom and equality are universal 
values of justice and that every society in the world ought to strive to 
become a liberal democratic society. … A Theory of Justice responds to 
critics‘ concern for an argument for universal justice that addresses 
reasonable people in all the world. It mistakes Political Liberalism‘s 
purpose to think that it must duplicate the ambitions of that earlier book. 
Political Liberalism, unlike Theory, addresses a problem within democratic 
and liberal theory; namely, how is it possible that there exists a stable and 
enduring liberal and democratic society that tolerates different views and 
ways of life when reasonable citizens disagree about fundamental moral and 
religious values?‖133 
 
This view of Rawls is, I think, inaccurate. Rawls seems to reject parts of A Theory of 
Justice and seeks to revise it, rather than add to it.
134
 The fact of reasonable pluralism 
invalidates it: ―the argument in Theory relies on a premise the realization of which its 
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principles of justice rule out.‖135 In this way, A Theory of Justice cannot be understood 
as Political Liberalism‘s counterpart with a larger audience. Rawls may still think his 
account in his earlier book is true, but, recognising the burdens of judgement and the 
fact of reasonable pluralism, he clearly thinks that reasonable people could reject his 
argument there. He does not, then, provide a comprehensive justification in this way. 
 The alternative way of justifying the organising ideas relates to the idea of 
possibility. As mentioned earlier, Rawls claims that an overlapping consensus is 
possible when he responds to the charge of utopianism by explaining that, over time, the 
organising ideas may become more widely shared and deeply entrenched, making an 
overlapping consensus possible. Given that Rawls thinks that incompatibility can be 
overcome thanks to citizens‘ recognition of the value of political cooperation, he might 
be able to claim that the organising ideas are justified by some sort of objective benefit 
that fair social cooperation brings to everyone. The trouble with this potential account is 
that there are many forms of social cooperation, so saying that social cooperation is 
good cannot justify one form above another. To illustrate this point, I invoke the 
Commonwealth example again. Strömbäck outlines Þorgeirr the lawspeaker‘s 
understand that ―it is not possible to give judgement in accordance with two different 
codes of law, one for pagans, one for Christians; then the community, as a legal whole, 
splits into two and the country will be destroyed in lawlessness and strife.‖136 From 
within such a perspective, the deepening of Christian values would bring about 
enhanced social cooperation, at least in the short term. The benefits of social 
cooperation could therefore be used to justify a movement away from liberalism, rather 
than towards it. They are therefore argumentatively useless. For this reason, Rawls 
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cannot state (even if he wanted to) that the prevalence of the organising ideas is 
inherently desirable because of the enhanced practical benefits of the social cooperation 
they bring with them. 
As such, I conclude that Rawls can argue that a society‘s liberalism can become 
more entrenched over time, and the organising ideas can become more deeply and more 
widely held, or that citizens‘ political values may grow to outweigh their comprehensive 
views in cases of incompatibility, but he lacks the means to demonstrate that these 
alterations are inherently desirable. A shift of ideas is not always positive, and one can 
only know for certain that a cultural shift in attitudes is an improvement if there is an 
objective standard which makes appraisal possible. Without such an objective standard, 
and given my interpretations, the idea of an overlapping consensus cannot be considered 
to meet the criterion of justice. 
 
4.4 – Stability 
 
Lastly, I turn to the issue of stability, noting an important and subtle way in which 
stability relates to the problem of justice. Given that Rawls is unable to provide a means 
of justifying the acceptance of the organising ideas, the stability of an overlapping 
consensus on a PPCoJ can only be as reliable as the prevalence of those ideas. Again, I 
refer to the Commonwealth example to illustrate and defend my account. 
 As noted in the introductory portion of the chapter, stability of the type required 
by Rawls can be understood as stability for the right reasons. Rawls has two reasons for 
relying upon this notion of stability. The first of these reasons is a moral commitment to 
avoiding the coercive use of state power, which Rawls views as illegitimate. Much more 
49 
 
important for the discussion at hand is the second reason: that, for Rawls, real stability 
must necessarily be moral just to fulfil its practical purpose. The very reason that Rawls 
states that, unless the context indicates otherwise, stability is synonymous with stability 
for the right reasons in his work, is because stability not for the right reasons is no true 
stability at all.
137
 As Rawls writes, ―a basis of justification that rests on self- or group-
interests alone cannot be stable‖ because it is ―dependent upon a fortuitous conjunction 
of contingencies.‖138 Practical, prudential motivations are invalidated when 
circumstances change, so it is impossible to rely upon them. If people have moral 
reasons for accepting principles, though, then they will be motivated to act in 
accordance with them even when opportunities to neglect them arise. An overlapping 
consensus encourages stability because citizens will have moral reasons to endorse and 
protect the PPCoJ. On the whole, these reasons seem compelling, and I agree with 
Rawls that, even for practical reasons, stability must necessarily be a moral affair. 
 The trouble with this idea of stability is that the moral reasons citizens have for 
affirming the PPCoJ are dependent upon the organising ideas, but, even in the ideal 
society, citizens do not necessarily have moral reasons for affirming those ideas in turn. 
As it were, the upper layer of the idea – that of overlapping consensus itself – is stable 
so long as the organising ideas are affirmed, but the lower layer – the organising ideas 
– cannot be stable in the same way, because, as I have argued in the previous section, 
they have not been justified. Of course, by making this point I do not mean to imply that 
the organising ideas are unlikely to remain a constant part of citizens‘ thinking. Perhaps 
they are very likely to do so. The fact remains, though, that mere likelihood is 
insufficient to meet the exacting criterion of stability that Rawls accepts. If real world 
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events can render unstable a modus vivendi which is based on prudential rather than 
moral considerations, the fact that there is no moral justification for the organising 
ideas should make us concerned about an overlapping consensus, too. 
 Importantly, the NoJ in the Commonwealth was not a PPCoJ subject to 
overlapping consensus. It was, I have argued, a set of shared understandings which 
gained widespread acceptance – and moral affirmation – without the basis of that 
acceptance being philosophically explored. Now, the Commonwealth did not achieve 
stability. I have not so far made any points about the decline and fall of the 
Commonwealth, and it is difficult to give the matter all the treatment it deserves. In 
1262-4, two and a half centuries after the conversion, the Icelanders gradually 
relinquished their independence and accepted Norwegian crown. Giving up their 
independence was essentially a modus vivendi itself: the alternative was a continuation 
of widespread civil strife.
139
 Those who built churches on their land were owed tithes 
from locals, which permitted the amassing of sufficient wealth and influence that 
powerful families began to retain standing groups of followers, to ―monopolize the 
control and ownership of many of the original chieftaincies‖ and to invade each other‘s 
territories.
140
 Partly, then, the Commonwealth‘s decline was a matter of logistics and 
practicalities. Still, I would like to suggest that the decline into civil strife was also due 
to the erosion of the NoJ over time. With the introduction of tithes, power relationships 
ceased to be voluntary associations and became legal requirements for one person to 
render unto another. This shift helped to undermine the fourth shared understanding of 
freedom and equality between landsmenn, in turn undermining the fifth shared 
understanding of the necessity of hóf. It is easy to picture how the loss of the second 
                                                 
139 Byock, Viking Age Iceland, 351. 
140 Ibid., 341-2. 
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shared understanding of the NoJ might follow from the loss of the previous two: 
violence became a more integral part of politics, with the role of goðar no longer to act 
moderately and wield political influence but to fight, protect and avenge. 
 Going any further into the specifics is not useful. For present purposes, it 
suffices to say that there was a NoJ which ceased to be effective. People originally acted 
in accordance with the demands of the NoJ for moral, political reasons, but, since the 
shared understandings themselves did not have a firm moral basis, changes of historical 
circumstance were able to undermine them. The same may be true of the organising 
ideas, which, like the NoJ, lack a firm justificatory foundation. The Commonwealth 
raises serious concerns, therefore, that if justice in non-ideal circumstances cannot be 
guaranteed, then neither can stability. 
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Chapter Five: Conclusion 
 
The Commonwealth in Iceland was a unique historical entity, and the events of its 
conversion in particular were unprecedented. In this thesis, I hope first of all to have 
offered an innovative (though perhaps not radical) understanding of medieval Icelandic 
society and one of its most pivotal events. Most explanations of how the conversion 
occurred overemphasise the role played by practical concerns, or attribute to the 
landsmenn a willingness to allow the course of their nation to be determined by 
religious beliefs about divination rituals or oathbreaking. Naturally, considerations of 
this kind may have played some part. It would be overzealous to claim that they could 
not have done so. Such major historical events are, after all, always complicated affairs. 
Nonetheless, I think that the Rawlsian notion of ideas implicit in the public political 
culture of a society is of great assistance in appreciating how the Commonwealth 
functioned so well and underwent a peaceful, political conversion. There are virtues and 
principles which, though political, are moral too. Thanks to the prevalence of a set of 
shared understandings constituting a NoJ, the landsmenn were able to maintain social 
cooperation in the face of potential religious strife.  
This way of looking at the Commonwealth highlights the ways in which it can 
constitute a useful historical lens to shed light on political liberalism from a new angle. 
In the Commonwealth, we have a comparatively simple, proto-democratic society in 
which to see both the strengths and weaknesses of implicit cultural ideas in action. 
Insofar as Rawls‘ theory is tied to such implicit ideas, the Commonwealth offers a new 
perspective on it. The ways in which the example of medieval Iceland differs from a 
modern democratic society make it interesting, not irrelevant. 
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The Commonwealth can therefore by used as a tool for critically examining 
Rawls‘ answer to the fundamental question: ―how is it possible for there to exist over 
time a just and stable society of free and equal citizens, who remain profoundly divided 
by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?‖141 My evaluation of 
Rawls‘ answer is highly critical. A just and stable society of reasonably divided citizens 
is only possible in the way Rawls imagines if political virtues can gain sufficient force 
to outweigh what opposes them. The Commonwealth shows that they can, so Rawls‘ 
answer achieves possibility. Justice and stability may remain beyond his grasp, though, 
except perhaps in a merely hypothetical ideal society. To make this ideal society a 
reality, the organising ideas need to become more embedded, but the attempt to bring 
that about must itself be justified. A comprehensive justification is illegitimate from the 
perspective of political liberalism. An alternative justification of them would be to point 
out on practical grounds the objective benefits of social cooperation, but, as the 
Commonwealth again demonstrates, such benefits can justify a slide away from 
liberalism as much as towards it. If the organising ideas lack a moral justification, 
though, then any conception founded upon them can only be as stable as they are, since 
true stability depends upon morality. The NoJ, though moral in content, also lacked 
moral justification, and steadily degraded over time as practical changes wore it down. 
The Commonwealth therefore seems to arouse suspicions about the stability of Rawls‘ 
solution. 
Of course, these conclusions can only be taken in a certain limited way. In 
particular, Rawls spends all of Political Liberalism answering the fundamental question, 
and I have only fixated upon specific elements of this answer. My approach is therefore 
                                                 
141 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 4. 
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somewhat narrow, but focuses, I think, upon some of the main areas where the 
Commonwealth example is most relevant. Admittedly, my conclusions are contingent 
upon certain interpretations of Rawls. If these interpretations are inaccurate, my 
criticisms collapse. Even if they are accurate, it would be possible for a defender of 
Rawls simply to claim that the points about the ideal society are all that are necessary. 
From my perspective, to do so would be – to borrow an image from Schopenhauer – to 
retreat into a ―fortress that could not be taken by attack from without.‖142 Besides the 
concerns I raise about the stability of an overlapping consensus, I offer no means of 
capturing that fortress. Still, though largely safe within its walls, I believe that Rawls 
must sally forth in order to tell us anything meaningful. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
142
Arthur Schopenhauer,  The World as Will and Representation, trans. E.F.J. Payne (Indian Hills: The 
Falcon Wing‘s Press, 1958), Vol. 2, p.195. 
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